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INTRODUCTION
Mutual funds generally do not invest in venture capital, private
equity, or restricted shares of public companies! Consequently,
individuals who desire to invest in such securities are unable to do
so through their investments in diversified mutual funds. While
limited partnerships and other structures have certain advantages
over mutual funds for investing in illiquid equity securities, the
advantages are not sufficient to explain the near absence of these
securities in closed-end and open-end funds. Analysis in this paper
suggests that public policies and regulations preclude economically
significant mutual fund involvement in the markets for illiquid
equity securities. Based on our analysis, alternatives to current
policies could reduce barriers to mutual fund investment without
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"Entrepreneurship on the Technology Frontier," at the Owen School, Vanderbilt
University, October 2000. We also received helpful comments from Tom
Borcherding, Art Denzau, Dennis Karijala, Tom Willett, and participants of the
Claremont Colleges Economics Workshop.
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L See 17 C.F.IR § 270.2a-4 (2001). Valuation requirements under the
statute discourage investment in these types of assets. Id
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exposing mutual fund investors to excessive risk or potential
manipulation.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "Act" or the "1940
Act")2 establishes rules and procedures for forming and operating
closed-end and open-end funds? Among its provisions, the Act
establishes principles for valuing fund assets, and requires each
fund to regularly compute and report the net asset value ("NAV")
of its holdings.! Rule 2a-4(a)(1) of the Act provides, "Portfolio
securities with respect to which quotations are readily available
shall be valued at current market value, and other securities and
assets shall be valued at fair value as determined in good faith by
the board of directors of the registered company. ,,"
The 1940 Act charges the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission") with responsibility
for establishing and enforcing financial reporting policies that
mutual funds must follow." Acting under this authority, in 1969 the
Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. 113 ("ASR
113").' One year later, in 1970, it issued Accounting Series Release
118 ("ASR 118").8 These interpretive releases prescribe the SEC's
standards and policies for mutual fund valuation of privately
placed and restricted shares and other assets where market
quotations are not readily available.9
2. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq.. (2000).
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22 et seq. (2000)
5. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(1) (2001).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq..
7. Statement Regarding "Restricted Securities", Accounting Series Release
No. 113, Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, [1937-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,135, at 62,283-62,288 (October 21, 1969)
[hereinafter ASR 1131.
8. Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 6295, [1937-1982 Transfer
Binder] SEC Accounting Rules Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,140, at 62,293-
62,298 (December 23, 1970) [hereinafter ASR 118].
9. See ASR 113, supra note 7; see also ASR 118, supra note 8. In December
1999 and April 2001, the SEC division of Investment Management reinforced the
Commission's prescription in ASR 113 and 118 in letters to the Investment
Company Institute ("ICI"). Letter from the Division of Investment Management
to the ICI Regarding Valuation Issues (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Letter];
"FAIR VALUE" STANDARD
The Act and the ASRs establish a fair value "certification
standard," where mutual fund boards are required to make good-
faith fair-value determinations." The SEC requires boards to
produce and maintain records of their valuation policies,
deliberations, and conclusions, and to preserve the records for
audit.1 The board "certifies" the values of the illiquid assets and
the auditor "certifies" the board's adherence to its valuation
policies.' The SEC constrains good faith valuation by requiring
that fair value be based on "value in current sale;" fundamentally a
liquidation value principle.'
We present evidence that, follovng these changes in SEC
policy, closed-end funds, in particular, retreated from investment in
illiquid equity securities. 4 Mutual fund investment in illiquid
equity has remained low, despite recent rapid growth in the
markets for venture capital and private equity.' We attribute this
to the SEC's emphasis on fair value certification and its insistence
on using the liquidation value principle.
The SEC's guidelines for fair value reporting are now over
thirty years old.6 This period has been pivotal in financial market
thinking and research, and in legal thinldng about the workings of
the capital markets. Significant aspects of SEC reasoning related
to the fair value certification standard, as reflected in the ASRs,
are inconsistent with current financial economic theory, capital
:market evidence, and legal theory applied in other settings (such
Letter from the Division of Investment Management to the ICI Regarding
Valuation Issues (April 30, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Letter]. The Investment
Company Institute is an industry association representing over 9,000 opn.-end
and close-end mutual fund. See
http-//wvi.icLorg/aboutjci.html Oast visited Sept. 27,2001).
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (2000); ASR 113, supra note 7; ASR 113,
supra note S.
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ Soa-1 et seq.; ASR 113, supra noteS.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2001).
13. ASR 113, supra note 7.
14. See infra Part IV.B.2.
15. Venture Capital - Money to Burn, THE EcONOMIST, May 27, 2000 at 71;
RICHARD SMrTH & JANET IQHoLM SMITH, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANcE 497
(John Wiley 2000).
16. See ASR 113, supra note 7; ASR 113, supra note 3. ASR 113 and 113
were passed in 1969 and 1970, respectively.
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as in fraud-on-the-market cases).17 We find that the fair-value
standard biases investment company investments away from
restricted shares and other fair-value assets; constrains the ability
of individuals to invest in venture capital, private equity, and
restricted stock; and creates incentives to devise alternative
organizational forms that avoid classification as investment
companies.
We compare the current certification standard to an
alternative of placing greater reliance on transparency regarding a
fund's holdings. We also compare the current-sale valuation
principle to an alternative of allowing funds more latitude in their
value determinations. 8 Our analysis suggests that these changes
would enable funds to increase investments in venture capital,
private equity, and restricted shares; reduce efforts to circumvent
jurisdiction of the Investment Company Act; and increase
opportunities for individuals to invest in restricted shares and other
illiquid equity claims.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON RESTRICTED-SHARE REGULATION
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Act of 193319 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342' are the principal federal statutes that control public sale and
distribution of securities. The Securities Act relates primarily to
initial issuance and the Exchange Act relates primarily to
subsequent trading.' Under the Securities Act, issuers of
17. See Mark Mitchell & Jeffrey Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in
Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
49 Bus. LAW. 545 (1994) (providing a general review of financial economic
theory and evidence, and applications in securities litigation).
18. As we explain below, transparency is particularly important to closed-end
fund investment, whereas relaxation of the liquidation value standard is essential
to open-end fund investment.
19. The Securities Act of 1933,15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (2000).
20. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (2000).
21. JAMEs D. COX Er AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 3-9 (Richard A. Epstein
et al. eds., Aspen Law & Business 2d ed. 1997).
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registered shares sell to investors via a prospectus that contains
SEC-prescribed information about the issuer and the offering.n
After the offering, investors can trade the shares in the capital
markets. To encourage exchange after the initial public sale, the
Exchange Act requires the issuer to report financial information on
an on-going basis.'
In part, these Acts were reactions to perceived abuses in the
securities market before and during the Depression and to
concerns that, in the absence of regulation, small investors would
not have sufficient access to information. 4 However, the 1933 Act
recognizes that private transactions among sophisticated investors
do not require the same level of oversightO Accordingly, it
exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."s
Implementation of the private offering exemption is complex.
On one hand, the SEC recognizes that an investor, at some point, is
likely to want to resell shares acquired in a private transaction, and
that formal registration at that point may not be practicar On the
other, ability to resell vAthout registration could enable an issuer to
circumvent the intent of Securities Act registration. To balance
these considerations, the acts permit secondary market sales of
limited quantities of unregistered shares of public companies
("reporting companies"), that were acquired in private
transactions, provided the shares were purchased originally for
investment purpose and not for resale. Subsequently, Rule 144
formalized a safe harbor that could be used to meet the
"investment purpose" requirement? Under Rule 144,
unregistered securities could enter the public market either by
registration or by gradual sale ("dribble out") without registration,
after a specified minimum holding period." Because of these
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa (2000).
23. The Securities Exchange Act, §§ 77a eL seq..
24. Cox, supra note 21, at 3-9.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
26. ld.
27. 17 C.F.1R § 230.144 (2001).
2& 1
29. 1d
30. Id. Rule 144 was enacted in 1972 and was anticipated in the drafting of
2001]
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restrictions on resale, privately placed unregistered shares of public
companies are referred to as "restricted shares."
31
B. The Investment Company Act of1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940n is the primary
legislation that governs the operation of mutual funds. The Act
requires that each fund regularly compute and report the NAV of
its holdings.3 Such a calculation is simple for publicly traded
securities, where transactions prices or market value bid-ask
quotations are available. Other securities, however, must be
valued at fair value by the fund's board. Beyond articulating the
principle of good faith, the Act is silent as to what fair value means,
how it is to be determined, or what factors a board can consider in
its determination of fair value.
C. Accounting Series Releases113 and 118
Thirty years after passage of the Investment Company Act, the
SEC issued ASRs 113' and 118.' It did so in response to the fact
that some closed-end and open-end funds were acquiring material
the ASRs. The holding period requirements of the Rule have changed over time
and are somewhat different if the holder is deemed to be a "control person" or
an "affiliated investor" of the issuing firm. Id. Affiliates are subject to Rule
144's volume limitations even as to their unrestricted securities. Id. Moreover, it
makes no difference how long their "holding period" is. Id. The concept of
holding period applies to affiliates only in the negative sense that they cannot sell
restricted securities until they have held them for the requisite holding period,
which is the same as the holding period for everybody else (1 year). Id.
31. Restricted securities also are known as "letter stock" because of the
practice of requiring the buyer to furnish an "investment letter" representing that
the purchase is for investment and not for resale. FREDRICK D. LIPMAN, GOING
PUBLIC (1994); ASR 113, supra note 7, 62,284. This serves to substantiate that
the transaction is within the "private offering exemption" from registration under
4(2) of the Securities Act. Id. The term "restricted shares" is sometimes used
more broadly to include shares of non-public companies. We refer to shares of
non-reporting companies as private equity.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (2000).
33. Id.
34. ASR 113, supra note 7.
35. ASR 118, supra note 8.
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holdings of restricted shares.2' In ASR 113, the Commission states
that, "[f]or the year 1968, annual reports filed by registered
investment companies indicate that open-end and closed-end
companies together held in excess of $4.2 billion of restricted
equity securities." ' Open-end companies accounted for about $3.2
billion of these restricted securities which represented 4.4 percent
of their total net assets."
The SEC's concern with investment in restricted shares is
apparent in an SEC study published in 1971, but with much of the
analysis completed during 1969?, In it, the Commission points to
"competitive pressures on portfolio managers to improve
investment performance,"'" and states, "[olne disquieting result of
these pressures has been to provide an incentive for investment
managers to assume higher and higher levels of investment
risk.... a result that often is not apparent to the portfolio's
sponsors or beneficial ow/ners."4  Based on survey data, the SEC
reports a rapid increase in mutual fund investments in illiquid
equity (including restricted shares, venture capital, and private
equity investments).42 Investments by survey respondents in such
securities increased by ninety-one percent from 1966 to 1967, and
by 315% from 1967 to 1968; an overall increase of 694% from the
1966 base.'3 In 1968 mutual funds accounted for twenty-nine
percent of institutional investment in illiquid equities, compared to
thirteen percent in 1966. " The study expressed concern that the
mutual fund investments were concentrated among a few funds.
In the SEC's sample, five open-end funds that were early movers
36. IdM; ASR 113, supra note 7.
37. ASR 113, supra note 7.
33. Id.
39. Securities and Exchange Commission, Institutional Investor Study Report
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, (U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, 1971) (available on file at the Journal of Corporate and Financial
Law) [hereinafter SEC study].
40. Id.
41. Id. at xii.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2400.
44. Id. at 2420 (Absolute dollar investment declined in 1969, possibly as an
effect of SEC valuation policies under ASR 113.).
45. Id. at 2400.
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into the market accounted for 83.7% of surveyed holdings.' The
study also notes that institutions were following divergent
valuation practices, and identified this as a basis for concern.'
ASR 113 provides the SEC's rationale for its oversight of
investment company practices for valuing illiquid equity. The
release states, "proper valuation of portfolio securities" is
"critically important," because "distortions in the valuation of a
restricted security [including private equity].. .will distort the price
at which the shares of the investment company are sold or
redeemed."'  The SEC notes that fund managers who are
compensated on the basis of NAV or performance can succumb to
incentives to overvalue their holdings.'9 Further, the SEC
expresses its concern that overvaluing illiquid equity holdings can
mislead investors.'
In ASR 113, the SEC takes a strong position against using the
market values of public shares to value otherwise-identical
restricted shares. The Commission's view is that market
quotations only are appropriate for valuing securities that are
similar in all respects to the securities for which market transaction
prices are observed."1  "For valuation purposes, therefore,
restricted securities constitute securities for which market
quotations are not readily available."'
Noting that restricted securities often are purchased at
discounts relative to the market price of unrestricted securities, the
46. Id. at 2494.
47. Id at 2473. In the study, thirty-three percent of dollar-valued holdings
were carried at the current market price of freely traded shares less a discount, 41
percent were carried at the current market price of unrestricted shares, 5 percent
were carried at acquisition cost, and twenty-one percent were carried at other
values. Id.
48. ASR 113, supra note 7, at 62,284. The offering price of securities issued
by a management investment company is based on the net asset value. The
improper valuation of restricted securities would alter the net asset value of the
shares offered or, in the case of an open-end company, redeemed, and therefore
constitutes a fraud and deceit within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id
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SEC asserts the foUowing rationales for the discounts:
o This [discount] reflects the fact that securities which
cannot be readily sold in the public market place are
less valuable than securities which can be sold, and also
the fact that, by the direct sale of restricted securities,
sellers avoid the expense, time and public disclosure
which registration entails."
o To properly value restricted securities, the SEC
advocates, for the first time, value in "current sale" as
the valuation principle against which fund decisions are
judged.' Current-sale is a liquidation value measure.
It precludes valuing restricted shares either at the
market value of freely traded shares or at the fund's
cost of acquiring the shares."
At the same time that it precludes valuation at cost or at the
market value of identical registered shares, ASR 113 precludes
reliance on mechanical or formulaic relations between restricted
share value and registered share market value2 A fund may not,
for example, value restricted shares by applying "a constant
percentage or an absolute dollar discount to the market quotation
for unrestricted securities of the same class." In the view of the
SEC, such approaches are inconsistent with "good faith." 3  Nor
may a fund rely on mechanical or formulaic amortization of the
53. Id
54. 1d.
55. Id. As a general principle, the current fair value of restricted securities
would appear to be the amount that the owner might reasonably expect to
receive for them upon their current sale. This depends upon their inherent
worth, without regard to the restrictive feature, adjusted for any diminution in
value resulting from the restrictive feature. Consequently, the valuation of
restricted securities at the market quotations for unrestricted securities of the
same class would, except for most unusual situations, be improper. Further, the
continued valuation of such securities at cost would be improper if, as a result of
the operations of the issuer, change in general market conditions or otherise,
cost has ceased to represent fair value. In such circumstances, maintaining the
value of the restricted securities at cost would mislead investors as to the value of
the portfolio of the investment company that holds restricted securities.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id. at 62,283-84.
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restricted share discount at the time of the fund's investment in the
shares. 9 In taking this position, the SEC precluded reliance on any
of the valuation approaches that were in common use by funds.'
More fundamentally, the SEC suggests that any approach
that relates restricted-share value to the market value of
unrestricted shares can be problematic." ASR 113 explicitly states
a concern with the potential for stock price manipulation by
investment companies when purchasing restricted shares:
With a thin market, the news of the investment company's
purchase of the restricted securities may, by itself, have the
effect of stimulating a public demand for the unrestricted
securities, the supply of which has not been increased, and
thus lead to a spiraling increase in the valuation of both the
restricted and unrestricted securities.6
59. Id. at 62,284-85.
[T]he practice of automatically amortizing the discount over an arbitrarily
chosen period creates the appearance of an appreciation in the value of the
securities which has not, in fact, occurred, and accordingly, is improper.... An
undertaking by the issuer to register the securities within a specified time would
not dictate a different result. In view of the many factors that may alter the
date of the proposed public offering, it is at best speculative to use such an
undertaking alone as the basis for amortizing the discount. [Tihe ... adoption
by the Commission of the more definite holding periods contained in proposed
Rules [i.e., Rule 144, as discussed above and enacted in 1972] ... would also not
alter the conclusion that amortization of the discount may be improper. [Tihe
more definite holding periods.., are available only if certain specified
conditions are met.
Id.
60. See ASR 113, supra note 7.
61. Id.
62. Id. This concern may reflect the now documented finding that, on
average, share prices of public companies increase when companies place equity
privately. Karen Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm
Value, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1989); Michael Hertzel & Richard Smith, Market
Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately, 48 J. FIN. 459,459
(1993); Srini Krishnamurthy, Paul Spindt, Venkat Subramaniam & Trade
Woidtke, "Does Equity Placement Type Matter? Evidence from Long-term Stock
Price Performance Following Private Placements," working paper (1999)
(available on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law).
The SEC statement suggests that the run-up may reflect manipulation and that a
company may place equity privately to induce an increase in its unrestricted
share price. ASR 113, supra note 7. In contrast, the financial economics
literature suggests the unrestricted share price increase can be a rational market
response to news of private investment. Wruck, supra note 61; Hertzel & Smith,
"FAIR VALUE" STANDARD
In summary, the SEC concludes,
[Tihere can be no automatic formula by which an investment
company can value restricted securities in its portfolio.... It is
the responsibility of the board of directors to determine the fair
value of each issue of restricted securities in good faith; and the
data and information considered and the analysis thereof
should be retained for inspection by the company's independent
auditors. While the board may, consistent with this
responsibility, determine the method of valuing each issue of
restricted security in the company's portfolio, it must
continuously review the appropriateness of any method so
determined.'
ASR 118 reiterates the discussion from the earlier release-for
each asset in its portfolio, an investment company is required to
report both acquisition cost and (current sale) value, and to
disclose its valuation policy and methodology. '
supra note 61; Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 61. That is, the vllingness of a
well-informed investor to commit new funds, even at a discount, can be a po3tive
signal about the value of the company.
63. ASR 113, supra note 7.
64. See ASR 118, supra note 8, at 62,294-96.
In some circumstances value can be determined fairly in more than one way.
Hence [the SEC's] standards... should be considered as guidelines. These
standards should be followed, and a company's stated valuation policies should
be consistent with them. Any variation from the standards should be disclosed.
In addition, any deviation from a stated valuation policy should be disclosed.
As a general principle, the current "fair value" of an issue of securities...
would appear to be the amount which the owner might reasonably expect to
receive for them upon their current sale. Methods which are in accord with this
principle may, for example, be based on a multiple of earnings, or a discount
from market of a similar freely traded security, or a yield to maturity vith
respect to debt issues, or a combination of these and other methods. Some of
the general factors which the directors should consider in determining a
valuation method ... include: 1) the fundamental analytical data relating to the
investment, 2) the nature and duration of restrictions on disposition... and 3)
an evaluation of the forces which influence the market in which these securities
are purchased and sold. Among the more specific factors which are to be
considered are: type of security, financial statements, cost at date of purchase,
size of holding, discount from market value of unrestricted securities of the
same class at time of purchase, special reports prepared by analysts,
information as to any transactions or offers with respect to the security,
existence of merger proposals or tender offers affecting the securities, price and
extent of public trading in similar securities of the issuer or comparable
2001]
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The orientation of the 1940 Act and the ASRs is that investors
should be able to rely on the NAVs reported by fund managers.
To achieve this, the regulations formalize a certification structure
and require that fair-value assets be valued based on the current-
sale principle.' The implicit regulatory theory of certification is
that litigation risk creates incentives for the board and auditor to
provide reliable valuations. Both the current-sale (or liquidation
value) principle and the certification approach are problematic
from an economics perspective. We consider these issues in the
next two sections.
II. THE EcoNoMIcs OF LIQUIDITY AND THE CURRENT-SALE
PRINCIPLE
A. The Role of NAV for Open-end Versus Closed-end Funds
In ASR 113, the SEC states, "it is critically important [to
investors] that an investment company properly value its portfolio
securities,"' but the Commission does not distinguish between the
differing roles of NAV to closed-end and open-end funds.67 In fact,
the SEC's premise, that a distortion in restricted share valuation
will distort the price at which fund shares are sold or redeemed,
only applies directly to open-end funds.' Investors in open-end
funds always transact directly with the fund at NAV per share.69
companies, and other relevant matters.
Id.
65. ASR 118, supra note 8; ASR 113, supra note 7.
66. ASR 113, supra note 7, at 62,283-84.
67. Id.
68. See id at 62,284. ASR 113 lists special factors that relate only to open-end
companies, [illustrating that] ... it is desirable that an open-end company retain
maximum flexibility in the choice of portfolio securities which, on the basis of
their relative investment merits, could best be sold where necessary to meet
redemptions. To the extent that the portfolio consists of restricted securities, this
flexibility is reduced.
Id.
69. See Kathryn Haines, Closed-End Funds, Morningstar.com (Jul. 15, 2000),
at http:llnews.morningstar.conlnews.comlnewslMS/Funds/101/closedend.html;
BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 413 (John
"FAIR VALUE" STANDARD
New investments create new fund shares and increase the fund's
capital under management."' Sales of shares are treated as
redemptions and reduce capital under management. Thus,
management of an open-end fund cannot avoid determining the
NAV of its holdings on a continuing basis. If management
overstates the values of restricted shares, fund NAV w-ll be
overstated and fund investors vill pay too much. The SEC's
apparent concern is primarily with positive distortions of NAV7
In a closed-end fund, the manager raises capital through
selling publicly tradable shares.7 This is a primary market
transaction? Anyone who Ashes to invest in the fund after the
offering can do so only by exchanging already outstanding shares
with another investor' This secondary market transaction
generates no new capital for the fund.'
Because closed-end fund shares trade in the secondary market,
their market values can differ materially from reported NAV.?
Dowmes & Jordan Elliot Goodman eds., Barron's Educational Series, 5th ed.
1998) (stating that open-end fund shareholders buy shares at NAV, as well as
defining the share price of open end funds as NAV); Jeffrey Pontiff, Closed-end
Fund Premia and Returns Implications for Financial Market Equilibriua, 37 J.
FIN. ECON. 341, 341-370 (1995) ("Unlike open-end funds, which trade their
shares at the net asset value of their portfolio, closed-end fund shares are traded
on an exchange."); RICHARD J TEWELES & EDWARD S. BRADLEY, THE STOCiz
MARIaT 413 (Wiley Investment, 7 ed. 1998) (stating that closed end funds fund
prices have no direct relation to NAV).
70. See Haines, supra note 69; BARRON'S, supra note 69, at 412 (explaining
that, by definition, the open-ended management company continually create new
shares on demand).
71. Id.
72. See TEWELES & BRADLEY, supra note 69, at 413.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Haines, supra note 69, at 1-2. Of the 500 closed-end funds covered by
Wiesenberger in their 1999 survey, fourteen percent were equity funds. See
,VIESENBERGER INVESTMENT COMPANY SERVICES, INVESTMIEWNT COMPANIES
YEARBOOK 2000 30 (2000). On average, approximately seventy-five percent of
the closed-end funds traded at a discount in 1999, vth an average discount of
5.73%. Id. Based on this evidence of divergence in NAV and market value, one
cannot presume that reporting errors in NAV vll necessarily affect the market
value of the fund. SEC rules permit closed-end funds periodically to repurchase
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Such differences arise for a variety of reasons: embedded tax
liabilities might lead investors to value shares at a discount; fund
managers may be perceived to be particularly capable of adding
value or not; and NAV may be perceived to be an inaccurate
estimate of true value.' Differences between NAV and market
values may be of little relevance to investors in closed-end funds
that invest in restricted shares of reporting companies. The fund's
valuation methodology is likely to involve benchmarking against
the market values of freely tradable shares and is subject to the
SEC's constraints.' As long as investors have access to specific
information about the fund's holdings, the board's valuation is
unlikely to contribute to market valuation.
B. How Illiquidiv Affects Value
Other things being the same, an asset is more valuable if it is
liquid. However, the meaning of "illiquidity" is ambiguous, and
empirical evidence that can be used to assess the value of liquidity
often is misunderstood. In this section, we address three issues.
First, on fundamental grounds, how important is liquidity as a
determinant of the value of a fund's investment? Our reasoning
suggests that illiquidity of fund investments is unlikely to be a very
important determinant of value. Second, how does the empirical
evidence on transactions of illiquid assets relate to determination
of the value of liquidity? Large discounts in private transactions
are associated with information problems that make trading
uneconomical and are not necessarily due to legal or contractual
restrictions on liquidity. Third, in light of the first two issues, is
current sale value the economically correct standard to use for
shares at NAV, but do not require them to do so. Generally, the funds do not
repurchase shares.
77. See Haines, supra note 69, at 2. For a discussion of closed-end fund
discounts, see James Brickley, Steven Manaster & James Schallheim, The Tax-
timing Option and the Discounts on Closed-End Investment Companies, 64 J.
Bus. 287, 288 (1991); Charles M. C. Lee, Andrei Schleifer & Richard Thaler,
Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 75 J. FIN. 1 (1991); Haines,
supra note 69; Kathleen Weiss, The Post-Offering Price Performance of Closed-
End Funds, 18 FIN. MGMT. 57 (Autumn 1989).
78. See Brickley, supra note 77, at 291.
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fund NAV determination?
A useful distinction exists between illiquidity due to a legal or
contractual impediment to sale, and illiquidity due to information
asymmetry or other problems that contribute to high costs of
transacting. While a holder of restricted shares has fewer options
than does a holder of registered sharesv, that difference need not
result in a material difference in value.0 Restricting resale is costly
only if the resulting illiquidity limits investor choice. If resale
restrictions relate to a small fraction of an investor's portfolio and
the investor relies only on public information, then the illiquidity
does not materially disadvantage the investor. This principle is
implicit in the portfolio investment decisions of institutional
investors51 Open-end funds often formally limit their maximum
investments in illiquid and restricted shares to levels where fund
redemptions would not require liquidating such shares.' Closed-
end funds can, in principle, invest more aggressively in illiquid and
restricted securities, as they do not face the same liquidity
concerns.' Other significant investors in illiquid securities
(insurance companies, pension funds, and endonnents) either
limit the investments to levels where liquidity is not a concern, or
(as in the cases of venture capital funds and closed-end funds)
adopt structures that do not require them to provide direct
liquidity for investors.
Investors in restricted shares seek to earn return premiums by
investing in illiquid assets.' Two factors contribute to the potential
premium. The first is the supply of and demand for funds available
79. See BARRON's, supra note 69, at 321 (explaining that a letter security
cannot be sold in the public markets).
80. See William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of
Illiquidity on Stock Prices, FIN. ANALYSIS J. 60, 61 (Jul.-Aug. 1991) (explaining
that sometimes restricted shares sell at a premium due to control rights such as
the right to make appointments to the board of directors).
81. See JAMES L. FARRELL, JR., PORTFOLIO MANAGEMAENT: THEORY AND
APPLICATION (1997).
82. Actual holdings of illiquid equity securities are substantially below the
formal limits. MORNINGSTAR, supra note 144.
83. See Haines, supra note 69, at 3.
84. TEwELEs & BRADLEY, supra note 69, at 413-416 (outlining the liquidity
structures and strategies for open-end and closed-end funds).
35. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62.
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for investing in illiquid assets. If the pool of funds is small relative
to investment opportunities, then investors willing to bear
illiquidity risk can earn superior returns. Second, an investor in the
restricted shares of a particular company may be able to earn a
superior return by having an information advantage over other
investors. Normally, the investor realizes the return by purchasing
at a discount that reflects the return other investors would require
to compensate for their concerns about information asymmetry,
and for their due diligence cost of investing.' The return premium
is a gain the investor may capture by virtue of its prior (sunk)
investment in information about the issuer. This return is actually
a quasi-rent associated with the pre-existing informational
advantage of the investor.8' It is not a market return for bearingilliquidity risk.'
Presumably, issuers and secondary market sellers of restricted
shares also are seeking to maximize value. Their decisions to issue
or sell reflect their determinations that selling in a private
transaction is economically preferred to alternatives such as selling
in a public offering or foregoing a sale. It follows that observed
discounts on private sales must either be small compared to
alternative ways of raising capital, or sellers must be under
pressure to generate funds, and have no less costly alternatives.
Because restricted-share transactions often occur when an
issuer is under liquidity pressure, interpreting the evidence on
discounts and applying the current-sale principle are problematic."
Economic theory provides no basis to expect a large return
premium for bearing illiquidity risk. This is because many
86. Id.
87. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, EcoNoMics, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT (1992).
88. An investor in registered shares might also invest, hoping to gain by
selling on inside information later. Restrictions on resale limit this opportunity.
However, the lost opportunity should not affect the expected return on
investment unless insider trading significantly affects market returns on
unrestricted shares.
89. The SEC indicates that the current-sale principle does not mean value in
a "fire sale." However, even allowing more time to locate buyers, the current-
sale principle does not recognize that informational asymmetry and costs of
discovering information are primary determinants of transaction value.
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institutional investors can make restricted share investment
without materially affecting their overall liquidity. Such investors
therefore require only small returns for bearing illiquidity risk.
Currently, and in past decades, institutional holdings of illiquid
assets have been small in comparison to any foreseeable need for
liquidity!' Thus, low transaction prices for restricted shares and
other illiquid assets cannot be driven by institutional investors'
liquidity needs' Nor can large discounts be driven by the value of
foregone put options that marketable shares provide. Without
private information, the put option is of negligible value, as the
option exercise price is always equal to the contemporaneous
market price of the underlying security?
90. MORNINGSTAR, infra note 144.
91. While individual investors may have liquidity needs that would cause
them to discount the values of illiquid assets, such discounts reflect private
valuations, not market valuations. Market valuations are determined by the
liquidity needs of the marginal investors in illiquid assets (i.e., the institutional
investors).
92. An investor with access to private information would value freely
tradable shares more highly than restricted shares. However, as long as market
values reflect value to investors who do not have private information, reduced
ability to trade on private information would not result in a discount for
restricted shares. Longstaff derives upper bound estimates on the value of
liquidity to an investor who has perfect market timing ability. Francis A.
Longstaff, How Much Can Marketability Affect Security Values?, 50 J. FIN. 1767,
1767 (1995). He concludes that the value of liquidity to such an investor can be
substantial. Id. He also compares his upper-bound estimates to empirical
estimates of actual discounts on restricted-share investments and finds that the
discounts are similar in magnitude to his upper-bound estimates. Ld. In an
environment where it is not possible to forecast overall market performance,
perfect market timing is the analytical equivalent of perfect inside information
about firm value. The association between the theoretical upper-bound and
empirical estimates of restricted share discounts can be justified if it is assumed
that the market values of unrestricted shares are determined by perfect market
timers and that the investor in restricted shares would otherise have had the
same ability to exploit investors who could not market-time. Our discussion of
the value of the foregone option reflects the opposite assumption, that market
values are driven by investors vho lack inside information and that the value of
an unrestricted security to a market timer is not verifiable. Our reasoning implies
that value to a perfect market timer would be found by adding the value of the
timing option to the market value of freely-tradable shares.
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C. Empirical Evidence on Liquidity Discounts
Observed returns for investing in restricted shares include the
premium for bearing illiquidity risk, and the premium associated
with information asymmetry and due diligence costs." Economic
reasoning suggests that the observed returns are predominantly
associated with information asymmetry and due diligence, and not
with illiquidity risk. If so, returns should only be realized where
informational asymmetries are economically significant, and the
issuer is unable to overcome the information problems at low cost.
Thus, empirically, investors would earn superior returns when an
issuer faces an immediate need for cash and where an investor is
uniquely positioned to exploit important private information it has
about the value of the securities being sold.
One way to distinguish between returns for bearing illiquidity
risk and returns due to information problems is to examine
variations in discounts associated with placements of restricted
securities. ' A useful place to begin is with the 1988 Blackwell and
Kidwell study of relative costs of publicly-issued and privately-
placed debt." They examine expected yields on net proceeds for
firms that switched between public issues and private placements."
Despite legal restrictions on resale of unregistered debt, they find
no significant difference in yield on net proceeds between private
and public issues.' Their analysis suggests that issuers rationally
switch between public issue and private placement, thereby driving
the returns for investing in liquid and illiquid debt to similar
levels.98 For the issuers in the Blackwell and Kidwell study,
informational concerns were of high importance, as the firms were
93. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62.
94. ld.; Silber, supra note 80.
95. David W. Blackwell & David S. Kidwell, An Investigation of Cost
Differences Between Public Sales and Private Placements of Debt, 22 J. FIN ECON
253,253-279 (1988).
96. Id. Blackwell and Kidwell base their study on data from before
enactment of Rule 144A. L. Rule 144A helped to establish a secondary market
for privately-placed debt among Qualified Institutional Buyers, who are deemed
not to require the protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 17 C.F.P. § 230.144A.
97. Id at 272.
98. Id. at 273.
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all issuers of investment grade debt.' Correspondingly, the private
placement discounts were negligible."
There have been many studies of equity private placements."'
All find that, on average, the discounts relative to registered
shares, are substantial."u More detailed examination demonstrates
that most of the discount is related to informational concerns, and
not directly to illiquidity. 3 In their 1993 study of equity private
placements, Hertzel and Smith find that the size of the discount is
related to the cost of becoming informed about the value of the
securities!' Discounts are larger for firms that are difficult to
value, such as firms involved in new product development and
firms vith high risk of financial distress." They estimate that the
effect of restricted trading on the discount is 13.5% of the value of
unrestricted shares."5  Even for shares that are not restricted,
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Silber, supra note 80; Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62.
102. In its sample from the late 1960's, the SEC estimated that the average
restricted share discount was 23.1%, measured against the "ask" price for
unrestricted shares. SEC Study, supra note 39. For a sample of small private
placements from the 1980s Silber reports an average discount of 33.75%,
measured against closing price on the placement date. Silber, supra note 8. For
a sample of large private placements of unregistered shares by exchange-listed
firms, from 1979 through the mid4980s Wruck finds an average discount of
13.5%. Wruck, supra note 62. Using a sample of private placements from the
1980s Hertzel and Smith find that the average discount on placements of
restricted shares was forty-two percent, measured against the market closing
price ten days after the placement, which corresponds to a discount of thirty-
three measured against the market closing price three days before the placement.
Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62. For a sample of restricted shares from the 19S0's
and early 1990's, Krishnamirty, Srini, Spindt, Subramaniam and Woidtke find a
discount of 34.02%, measured against market closing price ten days after the
placement. ICrishnamirty, et al., supra note 62. Some argue that the private
placement evidence supports discounts in excess of fifty percent. See G.S.
Arneson, Non-Marketability Discounts Should Exceed Fifty Percent, 59 TAXEs 25,
25-31 (1981).
103. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62.
104. Id.
105. 1&
106. Id.; see Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144; Section
16(a) Reporting of Equity Swaps and Other Derivative Securities, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7187, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35,896, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,645
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discounts range from very large to zero or even slight premiums."w
Based on their evidence, Hertzel and Smith ascribe most of the
private placement discount to the due diligence costs an arms-
length investor would have to incur, to the quasi-rents derived
from an investor's ongoing involvement with the issuer, and to the
urgency of the issuer's need for liquidity."
Silber finds that restricted share discounts are inversely related
to the issuer's credit worthiness" and finds some cases of restricted
shares being sold at premiums."' He ascribes premiums to
considerations such as board representation, and factors that
receive little attention in the ASRs. Krishnamurthy, et al. find a
similar overall result. In their sample, the average discount is
10.7% greater than for placements of shares with registration
pending. They also find evidence that issuers choose rationally
between private placement and public offering, and that firms with
higher levels of informational asymmetry are more likely to select
private placement."'
D. Current Sale and Alternative Measures of Fair Value
The current-sale principle is at the core of potential value
distortions resulting from adherence to the ASRs. Fund boards
and managers must apply the principle to assets that they have no
current intention or expectation of liquidating."3 Reliance on
(Jun. 27, 1995); Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145
from February 1997. Id. If illiquidity caused by resale restrictions contributes to
returns, then opportunities to benefit significantly by investing in restricted
securities may not persist. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62. The Rule 144
restriction period recently was reduced from two years to one. Id. With the
supply of restricted securities constant, this change effectively doubles the flow of
funds available for restricted-security investment. Id.
107. See Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62.
108. Id.
109. Silber, supra note 80, at 60-62.
110. Several studies of the discount find that some restricted and unrestricted
shares are placed privately at premiums. See SEC Study, supra note 39; Hertzel
& Smith, supra note 62; Silber, supra note 80, at 63.
111. Silber, supra note 80, at 61.
112. Krishnamurthy et al., supra note 62.
113. ASR 113, supra note 7.
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market prices in actual transactions of restricted shares to establish
current sale value causes the shares to be valued as if they were to
be sold to an investor who would have to incur due diligence costs
similar to the costs investors would incur in dealings with ventures
under pressure to add liquidity. Yet, it is unlikely that a mutual
fund would purchase restricted shares hoping to realize an
immediate gain in a private sale.
Current sale is only one of several valuation principles that
have been applied to the term "fair value." Depending on how the
valuation is to be used, alternatives such as acquisition cost,
present value of future cash flows, or other measures could be
more relevant to investors. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), in SFAS 107, articulates an exit value notion of fair
value that is consistent with the SEC's current-sale principle."' In
SFAS 107, fair value is the exchange value of an asset in a current
transaction between willing parties, other than in forced
liquidation." As Barth and Landsman note, depending on how
investors use the information, entry value, exit value, and value-in-
use all are reasonable constructs of fair value."' Entry value may
be measured as acquisition price or replacement cost; exit value is
sale or liquidation price; and value-in-use is going-concern value,
or present value of future cash flows."
The fair-value definition most relevant to restricted and
illiquid shares is a going-concern measure. Such a measure is an
estimate of the amount an owner would demand for giving up the
rights to the future benefit stream, such as in a condemnation. This
definition properly focuses the valuation of restricted shares on
present value of expected future cash flows, and not on a
transaction value in a sale motivated by the asset owner.
Customary accounting definitions, like the SEC definition, make
114. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 107 - Disclosures About Fair Value of
Financial Instruments, 5-92 J.A. 139 (1992).
115. See Mary E. Barth & Wayne R. Landsman, Fundamental Issues Related
To Using Fair Value Accounting for Financial Reporting, 9 Accr. HORIZO';S 4,
99 (Dec. 1995).
116. Id.
117. W. 1L BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN AccoUwN-G REvoLutO.;
(1987).
2001)
442 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
no mention of a value-in-use concept for assets without active
exchange markets, and say nothing about the value of private
information the buyer and seller may possess."'
For financial assets held by passive investors such as mutual
funds, going-concern value (or present value of future cash flows)
and the value in a buyer-motivated transaction should be
equivalent, but for the buyer's transactions costs. The difficulty is
that, without active trading of the securities claims in a capital
market, there is no objective and verifiable measure of value.
Private sales of restricted shares, which are observable, often are
seller-motivated, and the sellers often face financial distress or
engage in high-risk business activities."9 Thus, transaction prices in
seller-motivated exchanges are negatively biased measures of the
values of assets that investors choose not to sell.
The current-sale principle makes economic sense when valuing
assets that an owner intends to sell in the near future, perhaps to
meet liquidity needs. Present value of future cash flows, a value-in-
use measure, makes more sense if the asset is a long-term
investment, such as a venture capital investment in a non-public
company or an investment in restricted shares. Market value of
otherwise identical, freely tradable shares is a measure of present
value."2 This measure has merit when the value of liquidity is
small, and when investors purchase restricted shares with the
expectation that the shares will be held until after trading
restrictions no longer apply.
E. Implications for Restricted Share Valuation by Investment
Companies
The SEC is critical of other measures of fair value, as they
generally would result in recording immediate gains in value after
an investment."' However, from a financial economics perspective,
the current-sale principle fails to recognize that much of the value
in a restricted-share purchase is created at the time of the
118. ASR 113, supra note 7.
119. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62, at 462-463.
120. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 61-83 (6th ed. 2000).
121. ASR 113, supra note 7, at 62,284.
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purchase.' This is because, at the time of purchase, the fund
realizes the benefits of incurring due diligence costs and other costs
of discovering the value of the restricted security. These costs are
reflected in a lower purchase price of the shares. The fund
normally reports the costs as operating expenses. Hence,
adherence to the current-sale principle effectively double-counts
the fund's cost of maling the investment and builds an
unrecognized gain into the fund's NAV calculation.
Il. THE CERTIFICATION STANDARD
Certification is relied on extensively as a device to enhance
capital market efficiency and to promote liquidity. Corporate
boards of directors effectively certify the reports they file with the
SEC and distribute to investors, and auditors certify that financial
statements are consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles.' Underwriters, board members, and others effectively
certify the representations contained in offering prospectuses and
the absence of material omissionsY" In contexts such as these,
investors rely on certification because direct observation is not as
economical.
However, certification is not a perfect substitute for direct
observation. Fair-value certification is a case in point. Fair-value
determination by a mutual fund board is only important to
investors if they do not have other reliable means of determining
value. If a fund owns restricted shares of reporting companies and
the information on its holdings is public, the board's value
determinations can be redundant to information already available
in the market. Given that the technology to transmit detailed
information to investors about fund holdings has improved
dramatically since the ASRs were introduced, the importance of
reported NAV to fund investors has diminished. On the other
hand, if certification of fair value is substituted for more direct and
122. Hertzel & Smith, supra note 62, at 462-463.
123. See Valerie Ford Jacob, Understanding the Securities Laws 2000 -
Registration and Reporting Under The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1193,
PLI/Corp 415,439 (Sept. 2000) (discussing corporate SEC filing requirements).
124. Id.
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specific information about a fund's holdings, investors can be
worse off than with a transparent description of the fund's
holdings."z'
One problem with certification is that well-intentioned boards
can fail to estimate accurately the values investors would ascribe to
the fund's holdings of illiquid assets. Expert opinions about value
can differ dramatically, even for restricted shares of reporting
companies." The ASRs, despite the limitations they place on
approaches to fair-value determination, still give broad latitude
with respect to the values boards assign.'
A second problem is that a board might conclude that
adherence to the ASR guidelines would not result in a valuation
that is fair to current and new investors in the fund. In particular,
the board may reject the SEC's position that current sale is the
proper measure of the value, or it may disagree with the SEC's
position about the importance of liquidity as a determinant of
value. In such cases, board members can abandon their beliefs, or
depart from the guidelines and face increased litigation risk.
A third problem with certification is that the ASRs provide a
roadmap to boards that wish to distort their reported NAVs. As
the cases below illustrate, the focus of SEC litigation over
restricted share valuation is more on valuation process than on
correct valuation."z As long as a board maintains records of its
deliberations and does not value its restricted share holdings too
highly, its conclusions about value are difficult for the SEC to
challenge. Furthermore, the ASRs provide no guidance for
valuation of investments in private companies. Thus, within a
broad range, the ASRs do not prevent a board from manipulating
its valuations of fair-value assets.
In the context of the certification standard, these problems
125. Some funds may limit transparent disclosure for strategic reasons,
perhaps to avoid providing information to competitors. To the extent that they
do limit disclosure, specific valuations by the board may be more important to
investors than transparent disclosure of descriptive information.
126. See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B.3 (discussing SEC proceedings of R.
Marvin Mears and Parnassus Investments).
127. See ASR 113, supra note 7; ASR 118, supra note 8.
128. See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B.3 (discussing SEC proceedings of R.
Marvin Mears and Parnassus Investments).
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create incentives for investment companies subject to the 1940 Act
to avoid fair-value assets. As described below, entities that wish to
invest in non-market assets now devise organizational forms that
enable them to avoid classification as investment companies. This
allows them to avoid the SEC's version of fair value, as well as
other provisions of the Investment Company Act. The result is
that current regulations reduce the abilities of individuals to invest
in venture capital, private equity, and restricted shares, compared
to a regulatory regime where a fund's costs of holding such assets
are less onerous and less constraining.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE FAIR VALUE CERTIFICATION STANDARD
Despite tremendous changes in financial markets over the last
thirty years, the SEC still applies ASRs 113 and 118 in its reviews
of mutual fund reporting practices.": In addition, though fund
investments in fair-value assets are now extremely limited, the SEC
occasionally initiates litigation based on its perception that a fund
has deviated from the ASR principles." Under the certification
structure, investors can initiate legal action if they believe a fund
has incorrectly valued its investments in fair-value assets."'
To assess the economic significance of fair value certification,
we examine the current investment practices of investment
companies regarding restricted or illiquid securities. To provide a
micro-perspective, we analyze two recent SEC actions, one
involving an open-end fund, the Parnassus Fund,' and the other
involving a closed-end fund organized as a Business Development
Company, Corporate Capital Resources, Inc."
129. See 1999 Letter, supra note 9; 2001 Letter, supra note 9.
130. See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B.3.
131. Jacob, supra note 123, at 444. "[A]ny information which is incorporated
by reference from the annual report becomes part of the Form 10-K and is,
therefore, subject to liability under Section 1." Id.
132. See infra Section IV.A.2.
133. See infra Section IV.B.3. A Business Development Company (BDC) is a
type of closed-end fund; BDCs can own larger fractions of the equity of their
portfolio companies and be more involved in managerial aspects of the
companies than can other closed-end funds. BDCs still are subject to "fair value"
certification of holdings.
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A. Impact on Investment Practices -f Open-end Funds
The open-end structure is appropriate primarily as a vehicle
for investing in assets that are freely tradable and liquid."
Liquidity enables the fund manager to respond to changes in
demand for fund shares.35 Nonetheless, within the bounds of
providing for liquidity needs, open-end funds can devote a fraction
of their resources to investments in illiquid assets."" Doing so
would enable open-end funds to enhance portfolio returns by
accepting illiquidity risk and by capitalizing on informational
advantages that they may have about specific companies." This
was the direction in which some mutual funds were headed in the
late 1960s, before the ASRs were introduced."
1. Evidence on Restricted Share Holdings ofOpen-end Funds
Based on concerns that open-end funds maintain adequate
liquidity, the SEC recommends that they limit investments in
illiquid assets to a maximum of ten to fifteen percent of fund
value."9 Even open-end funds that specifically target investments
134. See TEWELES & BRADLEY, supra note 69, at 415.
135. le
136. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (outlining the SEC's liquidity
requirements).
137. Vikram Nanda, M.P. Narayanan & Vincent A. Warther, Liquidity,
Investment Ability, and Mutual Fund Structure, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 417,417 (2000).
They have developed a model of open-end funds where those with investments in
illiquid assets use exit fees to limit withdrawals, and where investors with low
liquidity needs earn higher returns by foregoing liquidity withdrawals. Id. They
argue that open-end funds offer advantages over closed-end funds when investors
are uncertain about manager quality. Id. They do not address bias in NAV
measurement. Id. However front-end loads and exit fees also limit investors'
abilities to arbitrage pricing biases. Id.
138. SEC Study, supra note 39; ASR 113, supra note 7, at 62,284.
139. The SEC takes the position that open-end funds should maintain at least
85 percent of NAV in assets that can be sold within seven days at approximately
the price used in determining NAV and that 10 percent is a prudent limit on
investment in fair-value assets. See Interpretive Release Relating to the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rules and Regulations Thereunder:
Restricted Securities, 17 CFR pt. 271, December 31, 1970; Periodic Repurchases
by Closed-End Management Investment Companies; Redemptions by Open-End
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in small and early-stage companies have adopted the SEC's
guidelines. The policy of Pioneer (formerly Pioneer Micro-Cap
Fund) for example, limits investments in illiquid assets to not more
than fifteen percent of net assets." Similarly, Invesco Emerging
Grovth Fund I limited investment in restricted and illiquid
securities to ten percent or less of total assets."' In a Statement of
Additional Information ("SAI") for its Emerging GrovAh Fund,
Small Company Value Fund, Small Company Growth Fund, and
Post-Venture Capital Fund, Warburg Pincus states, "[e]ach of the
Post-Venture Capital and Small Company Grovh Funds may
invest up to fifteen percent of its net assets (ten percent of total
assets in the case of the Emerging GroAh and Small Company
Value Funds) in non-publicly traded and illiquid securities...."la
The SAI notes, "[m]utual funds do not typically hold a significant
amount of these restricted or other illiquid securities because of
the potential for delays on resale and uncertainty of valuation."In
Although SEC requirements and the stated investment
policies of open-end funds are sufficient to preserve liquidity,
actual holdings of fair-value equities are much more limited than
suggested by the policies. The Morningstar Mutual Fund 500
conducts surveys of open-end funds annually and reports the
percentage held of "restricted/illiquid securities." In the most
recent survey (2000)l" , we reviewed the reported share of
Management Investment Companies and Registered Separate Accounts at
Periodic Intervals or With Extended Payment, Securities Act Release No.
33,6948, Exchange Act Release No. 34,30967,57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (Aug. 6,1992).
140. Pioneer Small Cap Value Fund, Statement of Additional Information, p.
2, Sept. 6,2001, available at
http/www.se.gov/Archivesledgar/data1025S71000101696401500153fsm0906014
9c.txt.
141. Invesco Emerging Grovth Fund, Prospectus, p. 10, Sept. 11, 1995,
available at
http'Jlww.sec.govlArhivesledgarldata7781010 7073195000011.txt.
142. Warburg Pinchus Emerging Growth Fund, Warburg Pincus Post-Venture
Capital Fund, Warburg Pincus Small Company Growth Fund, Warburg Pincus
Small Company Value Fund, State of Additional Information, p. 24, Feb. 16,
1999 (as revised Jan. 3, 2000), available at
httpVlwv...sec.gov/Archivesfedgarldata/948207/000095013-00-00010.index.html.
143. Id.
144. MORNINGSTAR, INc., MORNINGSTAR MUTuAL FUND 500 (Kevin King &
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restricted or illiquid assets for funds that specialize in equities.45
With minor exceptions involving small funds, the share of
securities that are restricted or illiquid was reported as "trace" or
0-1%." Thus, open-end funds, even those specializing in small-cap
equities, now generally avoid restricted securities.
Virtual abandonment of restricted-share investment by open-
end funds suggests that the fair-value standard has reduced such
holdings below the level one could expect based solely on liquidity
considerations. The decline appears to be a direct response to the
SEC's fair value policies, including the current-sale principle.
Additional support for this conclusion is that open-end fund
holdings of privately-placed debt (by debt-oriented funds) are
much higher and in line with SEC policy limits.' Debt
investments are not subject to the same valuation difficulties as
equity, they are not required to be valued based on current-sale,
and are more easily tradable with other institutions under Rule
144A.14
2. Case Study: In Matter of Pamassus Investments (1998)
Because open-end funds have withdrawn from ownership of
fair-value assets, litigation is rare. One exception is the Parnassus
Fund."9 The Fund invested in restricted shares when one of its
portfolio companies, Margaux, Inc., faced a liquidity crisis and
came to Parnassus seeking capital on terms advantageous to
Parnassus." The Fund's response exemplifies the pitfalls of open-
end fund investment in restricted shares.
During the late 1980s, Parnassus accumulated 640,000
registered shares of Margaux at an average cost of $1.26 per
Jennifer Watts eds., 2001).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. MORNINGSTAR, supra note 144.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
149. In the Matter of Parnassus Investments et al., Initial Decision Release
No. 131, Administrative Proceeding, File no. 3-9317, 1998 SEC Lexis 1877
(September 3,1998).
150. Id at *2.
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share."' In March 1989, Margaux filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.' After the announcement, Margaux shares declined
in value to $.28, at which price Parnassus purchased 250,000 more
registered shares. ' In April 1989, Margaux, faced with a liquidity
crisis, approached Parnassus for an investment. Parnassus loaned
Margaux $100,000 to help it remain a going concern." The loan
was convertible to 1.5 million shares of restricted Margaux stock."
At the time, year-end 1989, the Fund's total NAV was $23.0
million, and the loan represented 0.4% of NAV. Initially,
Parnassus valued the investment at the note's face value of
$100,000.' In October 1989, when the conversion rights were
approved by the bankruptcy court, Margaux's registered stock was
trading for $.44.' g In January 1990, the Parnassus board decided to
value the note at its conversion value, based on the market value of
freely tradable Margaux shares (i.e., $660,000, or 2.9% of the
Fund's year-end 1989 NAV). In making the determination, the
board gave no consideration to the fact that the shares to which the
loan was convertible would be restricted."' The Fund carried the
note at its conversion value until August 1990. ~ At that point, it
added a ten percent premium to the note's value to reflect the
convertibility feature."
In December 1990, the Fund's board decided to shift from
market value to fair value for holdings of Margaux. At that time,
Margaux shares were quoted in the "pink sheets" at a spread of
$.05 (bid) to $.10 (ask).63 The Fund's manager indicated that he
151. The position represented 7.4 percent of the fund's 198S year-end NAV.
Id.
152. Id. at *3.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (calculating the loan amount by dividing $100,000 by $23 million).
157. Id. at *4.
158. Id. at *3.
159. Id. at *4.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162 Id.
163. In August 1990, Margaux was delisted from NASDAQ due to its negative
net worth. After delisting, Margaux stock was quoted only in the Daily
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did not believe the pink sheet price was a reliable measure of fair
value." The board elected to maintain the value at $.344 based on
its view of Margaux's future prospects."l
In February 1991, Margaux informed Parnassus that it was
performing below expectations." In March 1991, the board
reviewed its valuation and determined not to adjust the value.67 It
continued to carry the loan at a conversion value of $516,000 or
2.5% of Fund NAV.'" The Fund's auditor, Deloitte & Touche,
reviewed the valuation and methodologies used by the board and
found them in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.69 In December 1991, after further under-performance
by Margaux, but positive cash flows, the board retained its
valuation.' By then, the Fund had grown significantly and its
convertible debt position accounted for 1.6 percent of Fund
NAV. 7 In July 1992, Margaux showed improving performance,
but the Fund's board retained its prior valuation. " The board
retained the same valuation in December 1992 and continued to
grow, so the convertible debt position accounted for 0.9% of
NAy
73
In January 1994, the Fund became aware that Margaux's key
customer was having problems.'74 Based on that information, the
board reduced its valuation of Margaux to $.20 and eliminated the
ten percent conversion premium on the note. 5 In July 1994, the
Fund reduced its valuation to $.15 based on continuing negative
news. 6 In the fall of 1994, the Fund sold its holdings of Margaux
Quotation Bureau's "pink sheets." Id at *5.
164. Id. at *6.
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *7.
173. Id (calculating the loan percentage of total assets by dividing the debt
position by the funds reported NAV as of December 1992).
174. Id. at *23.
175. Id.
176. Id
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for $.27 per share.' On that basis, the original $100,000 loan
generated proceeds of $180,000.'7'
a. The Litigation
The SEC's position was that the Fund had violated the
Investment Company Act by not using the current-sale
methodology reflected in ASRs 113 and 118.P The court found
that the Parnassus board failed to act in good faith." It reached
that conclusion based on lack of evidence in board minutes that the
board had systematically discussed the difference between
restricted and unrestricted share valuation and on other indications
that the attention to the Margaux valuation was superficial. '
The court rejected the Fund's position that the value of its
holdings should not be constrained by market prices observed in an
"illiquid" (pink sheet) market." It also rejected the Fund's
position that there was no reason to discount the value of restricted
shares, and accepted, instead, the SEC argument for a fifty percent
discount." The court also rejected the board's argument for
ascribing a conversion premium to the note."
The Fund based its valuation, in part, on the prospect of
outright sale of the company (rather than just the shares), and its
potential to realize a control premium on its holdings."s The court
rejected sale-of-the-going-concern as a current sale methodology
and rejected the control premium, as the Fund's total interest
represented only about fifteen percent of Margaux shares." The
court also accepted the SEC position that the holdings should be
discounted by an additional twenty-five percent due to market
177. Id.
17& Id. at *29.
179. Id. at *30.
180. Id. at *38.
181. Id. at *47.
182. Id. at *54.
183. Id. at *45.
184. Id. at *51.
185. Id. at *48.
186. Id.
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illiquidity."'
b. Analysis
The case illustrates many of the problems identified in earlier
discussion of the fair-value standard. First, Parnassus, like other
open-end funds, as a matter of policy, did not generally invest in
private equity or restricted shares. Parnassus acquired the shares
in an effort to salvage its existing investment in Margaux and to
capitalize on its prior experience with Margaux by investing on
favorable terms. If, as the court finds, Parnassus erred, it did so as
a result of having to apply a fair-value standard, when its primary
focus was on holdings that are subject to market value
determination. It is difficult to argue that Parnassus intended to
deceive investors, as the Margaux position was small, and the
effects of its valuation decisions on fund NAV value were slight.
At any time between 1989 and 1994, writing off the entire
convertible debt investment would have reduced NAV by less than
three percent.
It is evident that the board repeatedly was involved in
deliberations concerning fair value. At various times the board
addressed the value of the conversion feature as an aspect of the
debt investment, the effect of illiquidity on the value of registered
shares, private information related to Margaux's prospects, the
possible control premium associated with its block-holding, and
value in the event of an acquisition of Margaux by a third party.
Also, the SEC's desire for certification was not accomplished by
involving an auditor, as the auditor certified that the Fund had
adhered to its valuation policies.
Instead, the law places the administrative law judge ("AL")
in the position of making value determinations. The ALl's
valuations often were inconsistent with general market evidence."
For example, the AL concluded that there could be no control
187. Id. at *47.
188. For example, in a recent case involving a closed-end fund, the ALl
imposed a valuation approach that does not reflect modem financial economic
theory: he valued options (warrants) at zero and valued restricted shares at cost.
See In the Matter of Carroll A. Wallace, CPA, Administrative Proceeding File
No. 3-9862, Initial Decisions Release No. 178,2000 SEC LEXIS (Dec. 18,2000).
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premium because the Fund did not have a controlling interest.
However, financial economics literature documents that a fifteen
percent equity interest can attract a control premium. In
conjunction with other shares, fifteen percent may be sufficient to
determine control, and often is sufficient to guarantee board
representation.
The AIJ also accepted the SEC's argument for a fifty percent
illiquidity discount, despite absence of evidence justifying the
discount.' The ALT ignored the convertibility feature of the debt,
treating the investment like common equity instead of a complex
claim that would give Parnassus a preferential position in the event
of Margaux's failure.
In the end, the Fund manager was forced to bear the cost of
litigation, even when the court felt there was little to be gained.'
Despite the substantial investment of time on the litigation, the
court ruling was a slap on the wrist with no precedent value. The
AUJ saw no intent to deceive investors, and no significant reliance
on the NAV distortions.'
B. Impact on Investment Practices of Close d-endFunds
The closed-end structure enables the manager to invest in
illiquid assets and operate without providing for investor
liquidity." The liquidity of fund assets is not directly relevant to
investors in closed-end funds because they are not relying on the
primary market or on liquidity of fund assets for their ovm
liquidity.'93 Rather, they rely on whatever liquidity exists in the
189. Parnassus, 1998 SEC Lexis, at *57.
190. Id. at *-74.
191. Respondents' actions did not involve fraud, but rather violations of technical
provisions of the securities laws.... resulted in minimal harm to others and afforded
them no unjust enrichment. Furthermore, prior to this proceeding, Respondents had
never been the subject of an enforcement proceeding. Finally, I find the need for civil
penalties to serve as a deterrent against future violation is w~holly unnecessary.
I. at "75.
192. See Haines, supra note 69, at 3 ("Since closed-end funds have their ocai
assets... ").
193. See id. at3.
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capital market for secondary transactions.'
1. Evidence that Closed-end Funds Avoid Restrict-ed Shares
In contrast to open-end funds, the investment policies of
closed-end funds are more varied." For example, the Royce
Funds annual report emphasizes the value of closed-end structure
for investing in securities with limited liquidity."' Nonetheless, the
fund limits itself primarily to investing in small capitalization
registered shares. " As of year-end 2009, Royce reported that only
1.31% of its micro-cap assets lacked readily available market
quotations and required fair value determinations." In contrast,
Equus II, Inc. is a closed-end fund classified as a Business
Development Company." The Equus II portfolio consists
principally of securities that are subject to restrictions on resale,
either because the security was acquired in private placement
without registration or because the fund has a controlling interest
in the company.' Many of the fund's investments are in non-
reporting companies."' Virtually all of its holdings are subject to
fair value determination.' Equus H is a significant exception to
the normal investment practices of closed-end funds. Among fifty-
seven diversified equity closed-end funds identified in a 1999
Wiesenberger Closed-End Weekly Review, Equus II was the only
194. Id
195. For an example of two contrasting closed-end mutual fund policies, see
Equus II, Inc., Form 10-K, Dec. 31, 2000, available at
http://www.sec.govlArchivesledgardata/878932/0000890566010002040000890566-
01-000204-0001.txt [hereinafter Equus]; The Royce Funds: Royce Value Trust,
Royce Micro-Cap Trust, Royce Focus Trust, Form N-30D, Dec. 31, 2000,
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912147/000100547701001826/0001005477-
01-001826-0001.txt [hereinafter Royce].
196. Royce, supra note 195.
197. Id.
198. Id
199. Equus, supra note 195.
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Id.
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fund with a significant fraction of fair-value assets. 3
2. Letter Stock Funds
Closed-end fund withdrawal from restricted investments is
linked in time to the SEC's introduction of fair value certification
and the current-sale principle. Between 1968 and 1969, six closed-
end funds termed "Letter Stock funds" by the Wiesenberger
Investment Company, were established with the specific purpose to
invest in restricted securities, presumably motivated by profit
opportunities in private equity. Information on the funds appears
in Table 1.2'
As an example, one of the funds, the "Fund of Letters (the
"Fund"), '" established a policy in 1968 that enabled it to invest up
to one hundred of total assets in restricted securities. The Fund
intended to invest at least eighty percent of its assets in restricted
securities, with at least fifty percent of its assets in restricted shares
with a public, unrestricted market and no more than twenty-five
percent in restricted shares without any publicly traded securities.
The Fund's valuation policy did not conform to ASR guidelines:
restricted stocks of public companies were valued based on the
discount at purchase, other restricted shares were valued at cost."-
Shortly after introduction of the ASRs, the Fund changed its
investment policy and name, and became a target in litigation
based on allegations of fraud relating to the valuation and
reporting of its restricted securities!" During this same year,
Wiesenberger highlighted concern about restricted stock
203. Wiesenberger Closed-End Weekly Review, (Thomson Financial) (Jun 18,
1999) (available on file at the Journal of Corporate and Financial Law).
204. Recall that "letter stock" refers to the practice of attaching an investment
letter to the security to substantiate the private offering exemption of the
Securities Act. See supra, note 31 and accompanying text (providing a definition
of letter stock).
205. Table 1, infra Appendix B.
206. Id
207. WIESENBERGER INVESMENT COMANIES, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER
TYPES 403 (v. 1969).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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valuations:
The restricted nature of the securities, however, does present a
problem in pricing the portfolio. Here, the judgment of the
fund's directors must determine the relationship to current
market prices of unrestricted shares or the current value of
securities for which no public market may exist. The problem,
of course, is of much greater significance to an open-end
company than it is to a closed-end fund.2
Figure 1  illustrates that despite efforts by Letter Stock funds
to make private equity investing available to the public, their
investments in restricted stock declined systematically throughout
the 1970s. Percentage allocations to illiquid investments declined
from the 1969 high of sixty-seven percent just after the
introduction of the ASRs (1969 and 1970) and other valuation-
related lawsuits were filed against the two largest Letter Stock
funds, SMC Investment Corporation and Value Line Development
Capital Corporation."3
No large closed-end fund has since pursued this investment
approach. Those that do invest in fair-value assets generally
organize as Business Development Companies ("BDC"s) and are
too small to attract large investors and too small for the board's
NAV determinations to create significant potential for litigation."'
This is in sharp contrast to the venture capital market, which
generated approximately $50 billion in new capital commitments in
211. Id.; see also Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq.
(2000); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq.; Valerie Ford
Jacob, Understanding the Securities Laws 2000; Registration And Reporting Under
The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, 1198 PLI/Corp 415, 439 (Sept. 2000)
(discussing the securities registration requirements).
211. Figure 1, infra Appendix B.
213. SMC Investment Corporation (SMC) is a defendant in: Orn v. Eastman
Dillon, Union Securities Co., 364 F. Supp. 352 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Value Line
Development Company is a defendant in: In Re Value Line Special Situations
Fund Litigation, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8099 (S.D.N.Y. June 13,1974).
214. The SEC's EDGAR database indicates that 42 companies established
themselves as BDCs between 1994 and mid-2000, and that 30 withdrew from
BDC status. Currently, there appear to be 30 to 40 BDCs in existence; they are
uniformly small.
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1999.215
3. Case Study: In the Matter of R. Marvin Mearx (996)
The SEC's case against a director of Corporate Capital
Resources, Inc.2 ("CCRS") illustrates the risks of closed-end fund
investment in restricted shares. CCRS was formed in 1969 and
operated as a BDC. 7 It invested in shares of non-public
companies and restricted shares of public companies, including
high-risk companies that faced significant risk of failure.' CCRS
acquired its shares in privately-negotiated transactions!"1  It valued
its investments in restricted shares of public companies by applying
discounts to bid-ask quotations reported in the National Quotation
Bureau "pink sheets. " ' This approach sometimes resulted in
reporting an immediate gain, compared to the price CCRS paid for
the shares." The Fund's President and Chairman of the Board
valued the Fund's holdings and reported to the Valuation
Committee of the Board on a quarterly basis.' The "Investee
Company Valuation Review" sheet for each company, showed the
pink sheet quote and value calculation.' With one exception, the
Committee approved the valuations'
a. The Litigation
In this litigation, the SEC charged that CCRS had materially
overstated the value of its holdings.= As a member of the
215. Venture Capital -Money to Burn, supra note 15, at 71. "In 1999 investors
pumped a record $56 billion into American venture capital funds." Id.
216. In the Matter of R. Marvin Mears, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Administrative Proceeding, Release No. 21783, 1996 SEC Lexis
523, (Sept. 3,1998). The case was settled before reaching a verdict.
217. Id. at *2.
218. Id. at "3.
219. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
221. Id.
222. Id at *4.
223. Id.
224. Id. at *3
225. Id at *2.
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Valuation Committee, Marvin Mears was one of the individuals
responsible for approving the valuations.'
The SEC's position had three main elements relating to fair
value certification: First, the SEC contended that the valuation
methods used by the Fund "were improper.. .because CCRS did
not value the shares at what it could realistically expect to realize
upon their current sale." ' Second, the resulting valuations "were
flawed" because "Pink sheet indications of interest were not firm
as to any quantity, let alone the millions of shares owned by
CCRS.' The method wholly ignored the underlying financial
condition and business prospects of the portfolio companies. 9
Most were unprofitable and/or insolvent."' Third, the Valuation
Committee did not follow appropriate process because the
"[clommittee did not hold regular meetings, or conduct
independent research, did not review any documents such as
contracts, pricing information, or financial statements."' 1 The SEC
argued that: "Mears never dissented from a valuation supplied to
the Valuation Committee," and that he knew that he was not
examining "the proportion of the issuer's securities which are held
by CCRS and the ability of CCRS to dispose of large blocks of
securities in an orderly manner. " 3
b. Analysis
The Mears case illustrates the procedural focus of the SEC's
enforcement actions and the analytical focus on liquidation as the
standard of value. Regarding the current-sale principle, the SEC
rejects the notion that pink sheet quotes are appropriate as a basis
for anchoring the valuation.'3 In its view, such quotes are not firm
offers to buy and CCRS's holdings might be too substantial to
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id, at *4.
232- Id. at *5.
233. Id.
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liquidate easily. While the SEC proposes that large block size is a
basis of an illiquidity discount, it ascribes no control premium to
block holdings or to board representation."' In noting that CCRS's
valuation approach does not directly consider the financial
conditions of its portfolio companies, the SEC implies that pink
sheet quotations are not an appropriate way to incorporate
financial condition into a valuation. The SEC's rejection of the
possibility of immediate increase in value after an investment is
consistent with the current-sale principle. However, it may not be
consistent with an alternative notion of fair value, such as going-
concern value or value-in-use.
Despite regular meetings, the SEC argues that the Valuation
Committee did not take seriously the Board's responsibility as a
certifier of value. 7 The SEC apparently expects Committee
members to do more than approve the computation of fair value; it
seems to expect the Board or the Valuation Committee to engage
in some activities that normally would be responsibilities of an
auditor.s For example, the SEC is critical of the Committee for
not verifying security ownership or market quotations." In
addition, the SEC implies that, unless the Valuation Committee
regularly challenges the valuation conclusions of fund managers, it
is not performing its function2'
The SEC is critical of Mears because he personally did not
dispute value conclusions presented to the Committee, did not
seek verification of ownership, and did not challenge the fund's use
of a valuation methodology that could result in value gains shortly
after acquisition of a restricted-share position."" Except for
questions related to the validity of some of the Fund's share
ownership claims, the SEC did not raise any issues with regard to
234. 1&
235. Id.
236. Id Though in the Parnassus case, it linked its valuation directly to pink
sheet quotations for Margaux. Parnassus, 1993 SEC Lexis. at *15.
237. Mears, 1996 SEC LEXIS 523.
238. Id
239. Id
24. Id.
241. Id.
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the valuation of shares of non-public companies.
V. REMEDIES
A. The Under-diversification Problem
Because mutual funds generally do not invest in fair-value
assets, individual investors are foreclosed from most participation
in the markets for restricted shares, private equity, and venture
capital. Foreclosure results in under-diversification.
Particularly with regard to venture capital, investment
performance in recent years exemplifies the consequence of under-
diversification. In 1999 and early 2000, many venture capital
limited partnership funds earned high returns on their investments
in Internet companies. '3 Investors in the venture capital funds
(primarily institutions other than mutual funds) often realized the
returns through IPOs of the portfolio companies. '  Thus, the
institutional investors in venture capital funds were able to lock-in
high returns by selling in a market where individual investors could
participate. Individual investors who wished to include Internet
companies in their portfolios could only do so by exposing
themselves to the risk that market valuations around the time of
the IPOs were too high. Effectively, they were forced to bet
against the venture capital funds that were selling. Exposure to the
risk of overvaluation could have been reduced had individual
investors been able to use mutual funds to invest in Internet
companies at earlier stages.
Investor demand to participate in a foreclosed portion of the
capital market historically has driven policy change and capital
market innovation. Fair-value certification, which triggered
mutual fund withdrawal from investing in fair-value assets, appears
now to be contributing to SEC policy changes and market
242- Id
243. Venture Capital - Money to Burn, supra note 15, at 71. "[D]uring 1999
alone venture-capital funds generated an internal rate of return to investors of a
whopping 150%... "IId
244. Id.
245. Examples include options, futures, and other derivative instruments, a
wide array of mutual funds, and real estate investment trusts.
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innovations.
B. SEC Policy Res.nrves
In 1992 the SEC adopted new rules to encourage mutual fund
investment in fair-value assets and improve closed-end fund
valuation. In its accompanying release, the Commission noted
that absence of mutual fund investment in restricted and illiquid
securities was foreclosing investors from participation in those
markets, stating, "[s]ome recent developments have indicated that
investors may not be able to satisfy their investment objectives
with the traditional procedures for redeeming open-end shares and
reselling closed-end shares."" ' For open-end funds, the
Commission attributed lack of investment in illiquid assets to its
seven-day redemption requirement, noting that fund liquidity
needs could preclude investment. :3 The 1992 changes allow open-
end funds designated as "interval funds" or "extended payment
funds" to provide intermediate levels of liquidity by taking longer
to pay redemption proceeds!"0
The Commission recognized that its prior restrictions on open-
end fund activity should increase investor reliance on closed-end
funds." However, noting that closed-end funds had not attracted
new investment, the Commission expressed concern that one
impediment to investment in private equity is that closed-end funds
tend to sell at discounts. 1 The 1992 rules provide that closed-end
funds can respond to market undervaluation by tendering to
repurchase their own outstanding shares at NAV.' " The rationale
for the change was to enable managers to reduce or eliminate
246. Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment
Companies; Redemptions by Open-End Management Investment Companies
and Registered Separate Accounts at Periodic Intervals or With Extended
Payment, Securities Act Release No. 33-6948, Exchange Act Release No. 34,-
30967,57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (Aug. 6, 1992).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 19.
249. Id. at 7.
250. Id. at 8.
251. Id.
252. Id.
4612001)
462 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
closed-end fund discounts by buying fund shares at NAV.'3 The
1992 changes were intended to "facilitate greater investment in less
liquid securities than is permitted for open-end companies,
including venture capital investments, securities issues by small
businesses, and less liquid securities issued by foreign issuers..."'
There are other indications of SEC and legislative concern
with the level of funds flowing into private equity. Congress, for
example, liberalized regulations for BDCs twice, once in October
1980, "The BDC Act," which also is referred to as the "Small
Business Investment Incentive Act," 5 and again in 1996, under the
"Securities Market Improvement Act.""' An SEC report,
published in 1996, includes the following reference to valuation:
Congress should adopt amendments to the BDC provisions of
the 1940 Act and the SEC should issue regulations removing the
liability of BDC directors for the evaluation of portfolio
investments especially for non-control investments in private
companies. The BDC program would be more attractive if
liability provisions were relaxed about the valuation
requirements of illiquid investments. Clearer guidelines about
such valuations would ease the impact of such provision as
well.'
Despite these intentions, the intended effects have not
occurred. There has been no appreciable increase in open-end
investment in restricted shares-the level still is essentially zero."
Nor has closed-end fund investment in illiquid assets increased.
The ineffectiveness of the 1992 changes is evidence that the
focus of SEC changes was on the wrong problems. The SEC's
open-end fund policy of reducing the need for liquidity can only
253. Id
254. Id. at 2.
255. Small Business Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477,94 Stat. 2275
(1980).
256. Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996).
257. Final Report of the SEC Government-Business Forum on Small Business
Capital Formation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of
Corporate Finance, March 1996, available at
http:/www.sec.gov/info/smaUbuslfnrepl4.txt.
258. MORNINGSTAR, supra note 144.
"FAIR VALUE" STANDARD
affect investment in illiquid assets if liquidity concerns were
constraining fund investment choices. However, as we have
discussed, liquidity is not the central issue. Liquidity concerns
could explain a low level of fund investment in restricted assets, but
cannot not explain why funds avoid restricted shares altogether.
The closed-end fund policy change, intended to reduce fund
discounts, is only tangentially related to the kinds of investments a
fund makes. A fund that is focused on fair-value assets potentially
can limit the discount by valuing its investments conservatively,
provided it is not concerned with litigation related to
undervaluation. Thus, permitting closed-end funds to tender at
NAV is unlikely to motivate investment in fair-value assets.
C. Market-Based Innovations to Apeal to InvestorDemand
A recent capital market innovation, venture capital holding
companies, enables investors to participate in the market for fair-
value assets, but avoids exposure to the Investment Company Act
and the current-sale principle. However, to avoid being classified
as an investment company, the new holding companies sometimes
must make investment decisions that are contrary to their business
models.
CMGI, Inc., for example, describes itself as a developer and
operator of Internet and fulfillment services companies.P
Incorporated in 1986, CMGI's business model is to add value to its
portfolio companies by providing centralized services and by
achieving synergies among the companies.:! t Accordingly, its
investments are long-term in nature. As the portfolio companies
mature, develop track records, and go public, CMGI's ability to
add value can diminish. CMGI designates its investments in such
seasoned companies as "available-for-sale securities." Thus, it
draws a distinction between investments where it expects to
259. CMGI, Inc., Form S-3 Registration Statement, filed September 11, 2000,
available at
http:lwww/.sec.gov/Archiveqedgar/data!914712000095017200015790000950172-
00-001579.txt.
260. CMGI, Inc., supra note 259, at 10.
261. Id.
262. 1&
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continue involvement and those it seeks to harvest.z3
CMGI operates much like a closed-end fund organized as a
business development company.' It avoids being classified as a
closed-end fund by limiting and categorizing investments in a way
designed to keep it outside the investment company boundary.2'
Evidence of its concern with being classified as an investment
company appears in a recent registration statement, where CMGI
identifies the following "Risk Factor":
WE MAY INCUR SIGNIFICANT COSTS TO AVOID
INVESTMENT COMPANY STATUS AND MAY SUFFER
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IF DEEMED TO BE AN
INVESTMENT COMPANY... Some of our equity
investments in other businesses and our venture subsidiaries
may constitute investment securities under the Investment
Company Act. A Company may be deemed to be an
investment company if it owns investment securities with a
value exceeding 40% of its total assets, subject to certain
exclusions.... Although our investment securities currently
comprise less than 40% of our total assets, fluctuations in the
value of these securities or our other assets may cause this limit
to be exceeded. Unless an exclusion or safe harbor was
available to us, we would have to attempt to reduce our
investment securities as a percentage of total assets. This
reduction can be attempted in a number of ways, including the
disposition of investment securities and the acquisition of non-
investment securities assets. If we were required to sell
investment securities, we may sell them sooner than we
otherwise would. These sales may be at depressed prices and
we may never realize anticipated benefits from, or may incur
losses on, these investments. We may be unable to sell some
investments due to contractual or legal restrictions or the
inability to locate a suitable buyer.... We may also be unable
to purchase additional investment securities that may be
important to our operating strategy ....
In contrast to mutual funds, CMGI accounts for its on-going
investments in portfolio companies on a cost or consolidation
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id-
266. Id.
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basis.' Only when it designates an investment in the restricted
shares of a public company as an available-for-sale security does it
revalue the investment at fair value? It determines fair value
"based on quoted market prices, net of a market value discount to
reflect any remaining restrictions on transferability." Thus, it
bases valuation on an estimate of going-concern value and not on
current sale."m The discounts do not appear to incorporate market
liquidity considerations or the size of the block that CMGI holds.
Idealab! is another company that is pursuing a strategy similar
to that of CMGI. Expressing a similar risk consideration regarding
its desire to avoid being classified as an investment company,
idealab! states:
We may have to take actions, including buying, refraining from
buying, selling or refraining from selling securities, when we
would otherwise not choose to, in order to continue to avoid
registration under the Investment Company Act. For example,
we may have to ensure that we retain controlling ovmership
interests in our network companies after their initial public
offerings, which would require us to expend significant amounts
of capital that we might otherwise use to create or acquire other
companies.m
The Company's preliminary registration statement includes a
discussion of its valuation principles.' Generally, its valuations are
tied to historical cost.'m In some cases, for non-public companies,
idealab! adjusts carrying value based on third-party transactions
pertaining to portfolio companies" For public companies, when
restrictions on sale are for less than one year, idealab! relates
267. lML
268. Id. at 8.
269. Id. at 10.
270. IM.
271. Idealab! Preliminary Registration Statement, Form S-1, dated April 20,
2000, available at
http:Jh/vmw.sec.goviArcbivesedgar/datalIO45647000109238-00000145.th-t. As
of this vaiting, the company's registration was postponed due to a downturn in
electronic commerce firm market values.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
2001] 465
466 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
valuation to the market price of unrestricted shares.' As with
CMGI, its statements are not based on the current-sale principle.n6
D. Opportunities for Regulator Reform
It is easy to understand why, in 1970, the SEC could conclude
that certification was the most effective way to address perceived
valuation abuses. The SEC's focus, at that time, was on individual
investors who were making private decisions about value.'m The
SEC's concern, as reflected in the ASRs, was that individual
investors could be misled by manipulation of the valuations of
restricted-share holdings.' Investors necessarily based their
decisions on information that was significantly less complete and
less timely than is possible today. Similarly, it is easy to understand
why, at the time, the SEC could settle on the current-sale principle
as a way to impose consistent and prudent valuation practices on
investment companies.
However, improvements in technology and the corresponding
ease with which individual investors can access information
suggests that the protections are unnecessary and problematic.
275. Id
276. A number of public corporations have established divisions or
subsidiaries that invest in private companies. Intel, for example, makes strategic
investments through its Intel Capital program. In 1999, its strategic equity
portfolio was valued at $8 billion, with marketable investments carried at market
value and non-marketable investments carried at cost. In a manner similar to the
holding companies, Intel can designate equity investments as "available-for-sale."
Available-for-sale assets are carried at fair value. Marketable strategic
investments that are available-for-sale are valued "based on quoted market
prices." Those that are non-marketable are valued at lower of cost or market.
The fair values of such investments are "estimated based on prices recently paid
for shares in that company. No consideration is given to liquidity issues. The
estimated fair values are not necessarily representative of the amounts that the
company could realize in a current transaction." See Intel Corporation Form 10-
K, dated March 23,2000, available at
http:llwww.sec.gov/Archivesedgar/data/50863/0001012870-00-001562.txt.
Generally, venturing activities represent a small fraction of the total market value
of the company and investors have no practical way to separate the two
components of value.
277. See ASR 113, supra note 7; ASR 118, supra note 8.
278. Id.
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Practices in use by public holding companies suggest a two-
pronged solution to mutual fund valuation concerns. First,
investors would be better served by greater reliance on
transparency and less on certification. Second, investors would be
better served by allowing fund boards more latitude in their
valuation policies.
1. Transnarencv v. Certification
As documented above, the same advances of modem portfolio
theory and capital market efficiency that underlie "fraud on the
market" theory, "truth-on-the market defense," and the ERISA
shift to the "Prudent Investor" standard, argue for greater reliance
on transparency of reporting by mutual funds, and less reliance on
certificationP' Transparency requires simply that a fund disclose
its holdings and describe them in terms of acquisition dates,
original cost, restrictions on the holdings, and other possibly
relevant information, and then allow the market to determine
value.
Currently, most mutual funds report the details of their
holdings only quarterly. NAVs, in contrast are reported more
frequently, often daily. Current technology enables continuous
reporting of NAVs, except vth respect to fair-value holdings.
Common practice is for funds to update the market value
component of their NAVs daily, but to revise the fair value
component only quarterly, or in response to identifiable
occurrences that could materially change value.'r Current
technology would enable funds to report changes in holdings daily
279. The fraud-on-the-market theory recognizes that most investors rely on
the market to evaluate information for them, rather than rely on their ovm
independent analysis of a stock's value, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 45 U.S. 224,247
(1988). The truth-on-the-market defense refers to a situation where investors
had available to them all correct information regarding a company. Even if a
company did not discuss the information, if credible news sources disseminated it,
then it is presumed to be lmown. See Julia K. Cronin et al., 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1277, 1322-1326 (2001).
280. See Haines, supra note 69. "The value of a closed-end funds NAV is
typically determined on either a daily or weekly basis." Id.
281. TEwELEs & BRADLEY, supra note 69, at 413417.
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or (if strategic concerns warrant) on a slightly delayed basis.
For restricted shares of public companies, a reasonable
argument exists that, unless fund managers have private
information about value, simply describing the holdings, the rights
they convey, and their acquisition costs are all that investors need
to make their own assessments of value. Whereas, withholding this
fundamental information, and simply reporting the board's
valuation and acquisition cost and identifying the securities as
restricted, does not provide investors with the information they
need to make their own assessments.
For investments in venture capital and private equity,
investors or analysts may demand more information than a fund is
required to provide. The evidence of current practice by venture
holding companies, however, demonstrates that even in the
absence of regulations, firms are motivated to provide the
information the market demands. When managers believe the
market does not recognize the value of company assets, they often
respond by providing more information to the market. CMGJ, for
example, files audited financial statements of some of its
subsidiaries with the SEC.' The SEC, in turn, makes the
statements accessible on the EDGAR system. In addition, CMGI
recently decided to present its financial information on a more
disaggregated basis.m As recognized in the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act,' insulating board, auditors, and others
from liability for (non-fraudulent) forward-looking statements,
thereby elevating transparency and narrowing the scope of
certification, enables company boards to be more open with their
disclosures. In an environment where undervalued companies can
respond by providing more information, companies that withhold
information are certain to be perceived negatively. There is no
apparent reason why mutual funds, less fettered than they are
282. See EDGAR Search Facility, at http.//www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.
Examples of CMGI's subsidiaries include Adforce Inc., Engage Technologies,
Flycast Communications, Inc., and uBid, Inc.
283. To enable the investment community to focus attention on specific
business assets, some companies have introduced tracking stocks that are tied
specifically to the performance of those assets.
284. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104 P.L.
67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
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today by the risks of fair-value certification and the current-sale
principle, would not respond similarly to the market's demand for
information.
By emphasizing certification over transparency, the ASRS rely
on the court system instead of the market to discipline fund boards.
However, as discussed above, the only cases likely to be heard are
those where the SEC can demonstrate that the board's valuation
procedures have been deficient.P In such cases, the court is in the
position of arbiter of fair value, a responsibility for which it often is
not qualified.
2. Fair Value and the Current-Sale.PrinciPle
Because it transacts continuously with investors, the
management of an open-end fund cannot avoid reporting NAV on
a continuing basis. However, the importance of fair value
certification by open-end fund boards is limited because NAV is
not the only information available to investors. Funds must
periodically report their holdings and must disclose their valuation
principles. Investors can easily discipline an open-end fund board
that distorts its valuations of restricted shares. A board that
overstates NAV, to an extent recognizable by analysts or investors,
is likely to face net redemptions. If the board systematically
overvalues the fund's holdings of restricted shares by, for example,
arbitrarily and unjustifiably marking them to the market value of
freely-tradable shares, investors vl be net sellers and assets under
management vill decline.
Ironically, the current-sale principle is an impediment to
transparency, particularly for open-end funds. If a fund is
compelled to employ a valuation principle that is biased relative to
the return it expects to realize, the market vill exploit the incorrect
valuation. With transparency, if investors or analysts recognize
that NAV of an open-end fund is understated due to required
adherence to the current-sale principle, the fund will attract capital
as new investors attempt to free-ride on the real investment gains
of current investors. Funds can prevent free riding by avoiding or
285. See the discussion of Mears, supra at Section B-3; Parnassus, supra at
Section A-2.
2001] 469
470 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW
severely limiting investments in fair-value assets (as is the current
practice of open-end funds), by valuing them consistently with
return expectations (which is not possible under current policy), or
by imposing large transactions fees.
Transparency would discipline fund managers to limit
investments in fair-value holdings. The larger and less diversified
the stake as a percentage of total assets, and the more uncertain
the valuations, the more incentive analysts have to search for value
distortions. Consequently, large holdings of fair-value assets can
contribute to fluctuations in the amount of capital under
management, increasing the cost and difficulty of fund
management. Transparency contributes to market discipline by
making valuation errors easier to detect.
A closed-end fund is essentially a publicly owned company.'
However, in contrast to publicly owned companies, the fund must
prepare its financial reports on the basis of liquidation value, and
not on the basis of historical cost.' For healthy public
corporations, it is easy to see that liquidation value is not important
to investors, who are attempting to determine going-concern value.
Furthermore, corporate boards and managers explicitly seek to
distance themselves from any role as certifiers of value by routinely
including "forward-looking statement" disclaimers in their
published documents.'
For closed-end funds, allowing greater latitude in valuation of
holdings would provide several benefits. First, it would enable
funds to provide more relevant information to the market and
reduce exposure to litigation risk. A closed-end fund that could
follow the holding company practice of distinguishing between
long-term investments and investments available for immediate
sale, could limit certification risk exposure related to long-term
investments. It could accomplish this by simply carrying the assets
at the lower of cost or established market, or by valuing restricted
286. TEWELES & BRADLEY, supra note 69, at 413.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 80-1 et seq. (2000).
288. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act protects managers of
public corporations from liability for non-fraudulent forward-looking statements.
See The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104 P.L. 67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995).
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share holdings based on the market values of unrestricted shares,
and allowing the market to make its own determination of value.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In an unconstrained capital market, financial economic
theory implies that well-diversified individual investor portfolios
would include venture capital, private equity, or restricted shares
of public companies. Inability of individual investors to invest in
illiquid assets results in underdiversification of individual investor
portfolios and may reduce expected investment returns. For
example, in the recent tech-stock boom and bust episode,
individual investors were harmed because they held technology
stocks during the decline but were unable to benefit from the boom
by investing early on in venture capital funds.
In principle, the easiest way to for individual investors to
invest in venture capital, private equity, or restricted shares of
public companies would by investing in mutual funds that were
partially diversified into such assets. Closed-end funds, in
particular could invest in illiquid assets, as investors in closed-end
funds do not look to the fund to provide liquidity for their
investments. Even open-end funds are legally permitted to invest
small fractions of their holdings in illiquid assets. Despite the
apparent opportunity to create value for investors, mutual funds
generally do not invest in illiquid assets. Consequently, individuals
who wish to own such securities are unable to do so through
diversified mutual funds. They are either foreclosed from those
opportunities or forced to seek alternative means of investing.
In this paper, we present evidence that the current lack of
mutual fund involvement in the markets for illiquid equity is a
direct response to SEC policies and regulations. During the late
1960s mutual fund investment in illiquid assets, restricted stock, in
particular, was on the rise. After 1970, however, funds began to
retreat from illiquid investments and are now virtually out of those
markets.
Our evidence suggests that changes in SEC policy caused
mutual funds to retreat from investing in illiquid equity. Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, the SEC requires mutual fund
boards to determine and report the "fair value" of their
investments in restricted shares and other illiquid equity claims. In
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1969 and 1970, through two releases, the SEC interpreted fair
value to mean value in current sale and imposed its own judgments
regarding possible relations between the values of restricted shares
and otherwise-identical freely traded shares. Our analysis of the
markets for illiquid assets implies that adherence to the SEC
interpretive releases would result in systematic undervaluation of
illiquid assets and would cause funds to understate their net asset
values.
Furthermore, under the Investment Company Act, fair
value reporting is a "certification" standard that presumes
investors rely on the value representations of the fund board and
its auditors. By depriving closed-end funds of the opportunity to
base valuations of restricted shares on adjustments to the values of
freely traded shares, the interpretive releases elevate the liability
exposure of mutual fund directors. We consider whether
"transparency" of holdings, as an alternative to certification and
current sale valuation could reduce barriers to mutual fund
investment, without exposing individuals who invest in mutual
funds to excessive risk or potential manipulation.
To assess the effects of the SEC's policies, we analyze recent
efforts of the SEC to apply the fair-value standard and examine
court decisions arising from subsequent litigation. We also analyze
the financial economics literature concerning discounts for
illiquidity and the implications for valuing restricted shares. We
examine several recent financial innovations that are designed to
open illiquid asset investment to individual investors and to
circumvent regulation under the Investment Company Act. We
conclude with a discussion of policy alternatives, including allowing
funds to rely more on transparency in lieu of certification and
allowing funds more latitude in determining and reporting the
values of their illiquid securities.
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APPENDIX B: FIGURE 1
Total NAV and Restricted Share NAV of "Letter Stock Funds"
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1978 1977 1978 1979
Year
Source: Table 1, supra Appendix A (providing source data for Figure 1).
